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C H A P T E R 270.
(Section 3 amended by 1888, 155.)
AN ACT TO EXTEND AND REGULATE THE LIABILITY OF EN
PLOYERS TO MAKE COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
SUFFERED BY EMPLOYEES IN THEIR SERVICE.
SECTION I. Where, after the passage of this act,per-
sonal injury is caused to an employee, who is himself
in the exercise of due care and diligence at the time,.
(1) By reason of any defect in the condition of
the ways, works or machinery connected with or used in
the business of the employer, which arose from or had
not been discovered or remedied owing to the negligence
of the employer or of any person in the service of the
employer and entrusted by him with the duty of seeing
that the ways, works or machinery were in proper con-
dition; or
(2) By reason of the negligence of any person in
the service of the employer, entrusted with and exer-
cising superintendence, whose sole or principal duty
is that of superintendence.
(5) By reason of the negligence of any person
in the service of the employer, who has the charge or
control of any signal, switch, locomotive engine or
train upon a railroadthe employee, or in case the
injury results in death, the legal representatives of
such employee, shall have the same right of compensa-
tion and remedies against the employer as if the em-
ployee had not been an employee of, nor in the service
of the employer, nor engaged in its work.
Sect. 2. Where an employee is instantly killed or dies
without conscious suffering, as the result of the neg-
ligence of an employer, or of the negligence of any
person for whose negligence the employer is liable
under the provisions of this act, the widow of the
deceased, or in case there is no widow, the next of kin,
provided that such next of kin were at the time of the
death of such employee, dependent upon the wages of
such employee for support, may maintain an action for
damages therefor and may recover in the same manner,
to the same extent as if the death of the deceased
had not been instantaneous, or as if the deceased had
consciously suffered.
Sect. 5. The amount of compensation receivable under
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the sum of Four thousand dollars. In case of death,
compensation in lieu thereof may be recovered in not
less than five Hundred and not more than five thousand
dollars, to be assessed with reference to the degree
of culpability of the employer herein, or the person
for whose negligence he is made liable; and no action
for the recovery of compensation for injury or death
under this act shall be maintained, unless notice of
the time, place, and -cause of the injury is given to
the employer within thirty days, and the action is
commenced within one year, from the occurrence of the
accident causing the injury or death. But no notice
given under the provisions of this section shall be
deemed to be invalid or insufficient solely by reason
of any inaccuracy in stating the time, place or cause of
the injury: provided, it is shown that there was no
intention to mislead, and that the party entitled to
notice was not in fact mislead thereby.
Sect. 4. Whenever an employer enteres into a contract,
either written or verbal, with an independent contractor
to do part of such employer's work, or whenever such
contractor enteres into a contract with a sub-contractor
to do all or any part of the work comprised in such
contractor's contract with the employer, such contract
or sub-contract shall not bar the liability of the
employer for injuries to the employee of such contractor
or sub-contractor, by reason of any defect in the con-
dition of the ways, works, machinery or plant if they
are the property of the employer or furnished by him,
and if such defect arose or had not been discovered
or remedied, through the negligence of the employer or
of some person entrusted by him with the duty of seeing
that they were in proper condition.
Sect. 5. An employee or his legal representatives
shall not be entitled under this act, to any right of
compensation or remedy against his employer in any
case where such employee knew of the defect or negligence
which caused the injury, and failed within a reasonable
time to give, or cause to be given, information thereof
to the employer, or to some person superior to himself
in the service of the employer, who had entrusted to
him some general superintendence.
Sect. 6. Any employer who shall have contributed to
an insurance fund created and maintained for the mutual
purpose of indemnifying an employee for personal in-
juries for which compensation may be recovered under
this act, or to any relief society formed under Chapter
two hundred and forty-four of the acts of the year
eighteen hundred and eighty-two, as authorized by
Chapter one hunderd and twenty-five of the acts of the
year eighteen hundred and eighty-six, may prove, in
mitigation of the damages recoverable by an employee
under this act, such proportion of the pecuniary benefit
which has been received by such employee from any such
fund or society on account of such contribution of said
employer, as the contribution of such employer to
such fund or society bears to the whole contribution
thereto.
Sect. 7. This act shall not apply to injuries caused
to domestic servants or farm laborers by other fellow
employees, and shall take effect on the first day of
September, 1887.
CH A P T E R 125.
AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE CORPORATIONS TO JOIN CER-
TAIN RELIEF SOCIETIES.
SECTION I. Any Railroad corporation operating a
railroad or portion of a railroad in this Commonwealth,
may, by vote of its directors, associate itself with
seven or more of its employees in forming a relief
society under the provisions of Chapter two hundred
forty-four of the acts of the year eighteen hundred
and eighty two, or may upon the invitation of any
society formed under said act, become a member thereof,
and may from time to time aid such society by contri-
bution to its funds or otherwise. The by laws of such
society shall provide for the manner in which the rail-
road corporation shall vote and be represented in said
society.
Sect. 2. The funds of such relief society shall not be
liable to attachment under trustee process, execution,
or any other process legal or equitable, because of any
debt or liability of the railroad corporation or of any
member of the society.
Sect. 3. This act shall take effect upon its passage.
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CHAPTER 155.
AN ACT TO AMEND AN ACT TO EXTEND AND REGULATE THE
LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS TO MAKE COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL
INJURIES SUFFERED BY EMPLOYEES IN THEIR SERVICE.
Section 1. Section three of Chapter two hundred
and seventy of the acts of the year eighteen hundred and
eighty seven is hereby amended by inserting after the
word "death" in the thirteenth line thereof, the follow-
ing words:- The notice required by this section shall
be in writing, signed by the person injured or by some
one in his behalf; but if from physical or mental in-
capacity it is impossible for the person injured to give
the notice within the time provided in said section, he
may give the same within ten days after such incapacity
is removed, and in case of his death without having
given the notice and without having been for ten days
at any time after his injury of sufficient capacity to
give the notice, his executor or administrator may give
such notice within thirty days after his appointment.
Section 2. This act shall take effect upon its passage.
VIII.
INTRODUCTION.
Before examining the provisions of and the de-
cisions upon the "Employer's Liability Act of the Great
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, it might be and undoubted-
ly will be of interest, ( to one who reads the contents
of this thesis), especially if the person so reading
be a..Massachusetts man" (possibly woman) born and bred
in the old Bay State, to consider some of the principal
facts and peculiarities of the said State, in order to
see .the necessity of such legislation.
Massachusetts has an area of about 8315 square
miles, and population, according to the last census of
2495345, 300 people to every square mile, who reside in
32 cities and 322 towns. A statement was once made
that the Governor could see the center of the population
from the State House in Boston, because of the density in
Eastern Massachusetts of the population. Thirty-two per
cent of the entire state is under cultivation in farms;
and in traveling about the State, either by railroad, or
by carriage, or as at this time, by that wonderful
machine called the Bicycle, which is now used so ex-
tensively by both rich and poor, one can see the vast
resources of our Grand Old State. As you go skimming
along, either by means of one locomotion or another, one
will not wonder at all why the Massachusetts Man loves
his own State so dearly. On all sides you can see
the wonders of nature, and what a great part nature
plays in the works of man. The country is diversified,
up hill and down dale, over bridges of what you consider
small brooks, but at times perfect torrents; through
pasture fields rich with nutriment for the animals which
so peacefully graze thereon; through vast tracts of
wood-land, seeing now and then a Fram House, peacefully
situated in some retired corner, where you would never
expect to see it, and a brown skinned, homey handed
farmer, willing to do all in his power to entertain
you if you happen to stop at his abode. But I have
not time nor space in this article to extol the beauties
of nature in my native State.
It must be confessed that the soil of Massachusetts
is not of the best in some parts, and many a farm has
been abondoned, the children either taking to the cities,
where they are either employed in factories or stores,
and not willing to work the "Farm", or the head of the
family himself removing to some Western State, seeking
a living out of a soil undoubtedly much worse than that
which he so lately left, and in the end returning a much
poorer but wiser man, and willing to brave the barreness
of the soil and rigor of its winters, to be once more
in his native State. The farmer may, as I have said,
betake himself to the city and seek for some employment
in a manufacturing concern, and the manufacturing in-
dustries are both numerous and extensive. There are
about four thousand five hundred establishments, with a
capitalization of over $450,000,000, employing upwards
of 300,000 people, who work very nearly 278 days out of
the 365 days of the year, which is a very good average,
and the amount earned is about $435 by each. The value
of the goods produced and work done probably exceeds
$600,000,000 annually. The New England States, es-
pecially Massachusetts, have some of the largest manu-
facturing interests in the world, for instance the silk,
cutlery, shoes, clothing, cotton, paper, etc etc. One
has only to take a trip from New York to Springfield
and from Springfield, Mass. to Brattleboro Vt., to
realize and appreciate the magnitude of the manufacturing
establishments. Take for instance, such cities as
Bridgeport, New Haven, Meriden, Hartford, in Conn~ticutt,
and Springfield, Holyoke, North Hampton, and Greenfield,
Lowell, Worcester and many other citits in Massachusetts
noted for the manufacturing establishments. Thus it is
evident that the facilities for manufacturing must be
great and the advantages of nature wonderful, so that
when brought by the hand of man into subjection, they act
as an agency by which these establishments are made to
become the principal means by which a very large pro-
portion of the wage earners of the population make
a comfortable living, and the manufacturer himself
becomes very wealthy, often times to the disadvantage of
his employees.
The needs of so large a class of the population
demand the attention of each annual legislature, and am-
ong all the recent enactments proposed for the benefit
of this class, none exceeds in importance the Statute
and amendments thereto, which I am about to consider,
and no single statute has been the basis of so much
litigation and decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court
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as this one.
There have been other similar statutes passed in
the different States, and a great number of decisions
thereon, but the time is too limited to compare the
same with the Massachusetts Statute. The Massachusetts
Statute is, as will be found on comparing the two, the
same as the English Statute, with slight variations.
(See 43 - 44 Vict. C. 42); therefore it is proper if not
necessary, to begin by considering how the English act
had been construed before our Statute was eacted. I
do not suppose that any English Statutes are held to be
in force in Massachusetts, yet the provisions of some
of them and the provisions of the acts of Parliment
for the punishm nt of other offences have been enacted
in every Stage of our history, and in such cases as well
as where English Statutes respecting civil concerns
have been enacted here, it has always been held;viz.-
that the construction given previously to the same terms,
by the Engli-h Courts, is the construction to be given
to them by our Courts. It is a common learning that
the adjudged construction of a statute as to its terms
is enacted as well as to the terms themselves, when an
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act which has been passed by the legislature of one
State or Country is afterwards passed by the legislature
of another. So when the same legislature in a later
statute, uses the terms of an earlier one which has
received a judicial construction, that construction is
to be given the later Statute; and this is manifestly
right, for if it were intended to excludee any known
S
construction of a previous statute, the legal presump-
tion is that its terms would be so changed as to effect
that presumption. ( 3 Gray 350.) Let us look then to
the general scope. By so doing we will see that it is
plain that it did not attempt to codify the whole law
as to the liability of employees. It was regarded as an
act passed in favor of workmen. (a) This act of
parliment was passed for the benefit of workmen, and
the duty of the Court is not to construe it strictly as
against workmen, but in furtherance, of the benefit
which it was intended by parliment. It was held to be
intended only to remove certain bars to their right to
sue for personal injuries based on their relation to
their employer. A point of very general application is
(a) 12 Q.B.D. 211.
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what defenses are now open to a master when sued by
a workman, under the Employer's Liability Act of 1887.
To determine this it is necessary to bear in mind how
the law stood prior to the passing of the act.
A servant might have sought redress from a master
for personal injuries subject to any defense the master
might set up, in the following cases : (a) For injuries
sustained by the servant by reason of the negligence of
the master himself. (b) For injuries sustained by
reason of the negligence of a servant acting in the
scope of the master' s employment. (c) For injuries
sustained by reason of the master having negligently pro-
vided defective or dangerous instruments or materials.
To these causes of action the master might have
set up, among others, the following defenses, viz: Tra-
verse of the negligence and contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff. These defenses the master
had irrespective of his being master and the plaintiff
being his servant. The master also had, in addition
to the above named defenses, two other defenses arising
from the relative position of servant and master and
peculiar thereto. He had the defense of what we may
term for brevity, the defense of common employment. He
had also the defense that the servant had contracted upon
himself the known risks attendant upon the employment.
In what way, then, has the Employer's Liability act of
1887 affected the position of the master when sued by
a servant or workman under the provisions of that act.
It is enacted in section one that where personal in-
Jury is caused to a workman, the workman shall be at
liberty to sue his employer as to the acts designated
in that section, and that in such actions the workman
shall have the same rights of compensation and remedies
against the employer as if the workman had not been a
workman of nor in the service of the employer nor en-
gaged in his work. What is the meaning of this ? In n,
Judgment it means that the workman, when he sues his
master under the provisions of the act, for any of the
matters designated, shall be in the position of the
public suing, and shall not be in the position a ser-
vant theretofore was, when he sued his master. In other
words that the master shall have all the defenses he
theretofore had against anyone of the public suing him,
but shall not have the special defenses he theretofore
had when sued by his servant. What then is the result.
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It is this, viz.- The defense of contributory negligence
is still left to the employer, but the defense of com-
mon employment and also the defense that the servant
had contracted to take upon himself the known risks
attending upon the engagment are taken away from him when
sued by a workman under the act. The conclusion is
then, that the legislature, while taking from the em-
ployer the two defenses above mentioned, has given him
a statutory defense which did not exist in substance,
viz: The employer when sued for a defect in the ways,
works etc. may set up that the servant knew of the
defect and did not communicate it to him, (the employ-
er) or some other person superior to himself, (the work-
man) in the service of the employer. This, if proved,
will avail the employer as a defense, and the only ex-
cuse that the workman would have for not communicating
the known defect would be to establish that his master
knew of it. The legislature has thus taken away two
defenses of the employer, and given him one also. This
is undoubtedly the true effect of the Employer's liabil-
ity act. As heretofore mentioned the Massachusetts
Statute is a decided copy of the English Act, and the
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Massachusetts Legislature was evidently content with the
meaning expounded by the English Parliment, intending
that the Supreme Judicial Court would construe it lib-
erally in favor of employees. It will be impossible,
owing to the limits of this thesis, to examine the legal
relations between master and servant prior to the Statute
and Judge Holmes says,discussing the provisions of the
Statute: "They cannot be made clearer by discussing the
principles of common law liability, or by referring to
decisions upon a wholly different kind of statute". (a)
The Employer's Liability act, so called, was ap-
proved as a law by Governor Ames, May 14th 1887, and
took effect, according to its section seven, on the
first day of September in the same year. An excellent
summary of the scope of the statute is given by Judge
Holmes, in the case of Ryalls vs. Mechanics Mills, 150
Mass.190(b)lst. It was an act passed in favor of work-
men, but it does not attempt to codify the whole law as
to the liability of employers. 2nd. It was intended only
(a)Engel vs. N.Y. R.R. 160 Mass. 261.
(b) Gilman v. Mechanics Mills, 150 Mass. 190.
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to remove certain bars to the workman's right to sue
for personal injuries based on his relation to his
employer, only removing the bars in the cases speci-
fied, and impliedly unaffecting defenses not based
upon the relation of master and servant. 3rd. The
workman's Common Law rights remain unimpaired*
In 1887 it was law in Massachusetts that masters
were personally bound to see that reasonable care was
used to provide reasonable safe and proper machinery,
so that if the duty was entrusted to another, and was
not performed, the fact that the proximate cause of the
harm was the negligence of a fellow servant, was no
defense. (a).
Chief Justice Field has said that it is settled in
this Commonwealth, that all servants employed by the
same master in a common service are fellow servants,
whatever their grade and rank. (b).
The rule that one servant cannot maintain an
action against a common master for an injury occasioned
by a fellow servant, rests upon the ground that he takes
(a) Lawler v. C. R. R.R. 136 Mass. 1.
(b) Rogers v. Ludlow Co. 124 Mass. 198-203.
xix
upon himself the natural and ordinary risks incident
to the performance of his service. The safety of each
says Chief Justice Shaw, in the much cited case of
Farwell v. B. & W. R.R. (a). depends much on the care
and skill with which each shall perform his appropriate
duty, each is an observer of the conduct of the others,
can give notice ofanymisconduct, incapacity or
neglect of duty, and can leave the service if the com-
mon employer will not take such precautions, and employ
such agents as the safety of the whole party may require.
Two Statutes were passed to more fully protect
employees in 1886, (b), and 1887, (c). The former re-
quired a report of accidEats to employees resulting in
death, or preventing a return to work in four days, to be
sent to the Chief of the District Police by the employer,
violation of which was punished by a fine of Twenty
Dollars. The latter for bade an employer to allow
children under the age of fourteen years to clean
machinery in motion, or any machine dangerously near the
moving part, with a fine of Fifty Dollars for violation
(a) Farwell v. B. & R. R.R. 4 Metcalf, 49, b7, 59.
(b) Statutes 1886, 260.
(c) Statutes 1887, 121.
either by the owner or his superintendent.
In the discussion of the statute which follows,
it will be seen that the bulk of the decisions come
under the first three sections, but we will take up
each clause seperately, preventing needless repition. In
the cases many of the declarations were drawn with
counts both at common law and under the Statute. (a).
Where such counts respectively present different issues
and involve different liabllities, it is within the
discretion of the Court to require the plaintiff to
elect whether he will have his case go to the Jury on
the common law counts or as framed in the Statute. (b)
This is quite frequently done in practice. In all the
cases the word"negligence", frequently occurs, and we
may close this introduction, (which we trust will enable
the reader to form an idea as to the contents of the
work itself), with a definition by Judge Barker in
Wilson v. Steel &c. Co. 163 Mass. 318, of the term: As
that disregard without adequate reason of great and ob-
vious danger which the law holds to be negligence.
(a) Practice act, Mass. Statutes, 167, 82.
(b) Brady vs. Ludlow Co. 154 Mass. 468.
PART ONE.
THE EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Statutes of 1887, Chapter 270,and amendments.
An act to extend and regulate the liability of
Employers to make compensation for personal injuries
suffered by Employees in their service.
BE IT ENACTED, etc. as follows:
Section 1. Where, after the passage of this act,
personal injury is caused to an employee, who is himself
in the exercise of due care and diligence at the time :-
(1) By reason of any defect in the condition of the
ways, works or machinery connected with or used in the
business of the employer which arose from or had not
been discovered or remedied owing to the negligence of
the employer of any person in the service of the em-
ployer and entrusted by him with the duty of seeing that
the ways, works or machinery were in proper condition;
or (2) By reason of the negligence of any person in the
service of the employer, entrusted with and exercising
superintendence, whose sole or principal duty is that of
superintendence, or in the absence of such superintendent
of any person acting as superintendent with the authority
or consent of such employer, or (3) By reason of the
negligence of any person in the service of the employer
who has the charge or control of any signal, switch,
locomotive engine or train upon a railroad, the employee,
or in case the injury results in death the legal repre-
sentatives of such employee, shall have the same right of
compensation and remedies against the employer as if
the employee had not been an employee of nor in the
service of the employer, nor engaged in its work. (a) And
in case such deith is not instantaneous, or is preceded
by conscious suffering, said legal representatives may,
in the action brought under this section, except as
hereinafter provided, also recover damages for such
death. The total damages awarded hereunder, both for
said death and said injury, shall not exceed Five
Thousand Dollars, and shall be apportioned by the jury
between the legal representatives and the persons if any,
entitled under the preceding sections of this act, to
bring an action for instantaneous death. If there are
(a) Amendment of 1892, Chapter 260. Section 1.
no such persons, then no damages for such death shall
be recovered, and the damages, so far as the same are
awarded for said death, shall be assessed with refer-
ence to the degree of culpability of the employer
herein, or the person for whose negligence he is made
liable. (a) A car in use by, or in the possession of
a railroad company shall be, considered a part of the
ways, works or machinery of the company using or having
the same in possession, within the meaning of this act,
whether such car is owned by it or by some other company
or person.
(a) Amendment of 1895, Chapter 359.
SECTION I, CLAUSE I.
The lawyer who proposes bringing an action for
personal injuries, must assure himself that the relation
of employer and employee actually existed at the time of
the injury, (a); and that when injured, the employee
was in the exercise of due care and diligence . Thus,
plaintiff's intestate was a switchman,and while attending
to his duties was struck by an engine and~killed. The
plaintiff was non-suited because there was no evidence
that he was in the exercise of such care and diligence
as was required of him. (b)
Where a workman was injured by the fall of a heavy
bale upon him, which he was helping unload from a truck,
owing to the sudden forward movement of the trueLk; all
questions as to his due care were sent to the jury.
In many instances the plaintiff is held to have
assumed the risk of injury, and though in the exercise
of due care, cannot recover, as where a workman, familiar
with the business of weaving, undertook to make repairs
outside of his regular duty with the result that his
arm was injured. The Court held that he voluntarily
(a) Dane vs. Cocrane Co.,164 Mass 457.
(b) Shea vs. B & M R.R. 154 Mass. 31.
assumed the risk of an obvious danger. (a)
A brakeman was killed while attempting to assist
in making a "flying switch". The evidence showed that
there was nothing defective in the equipment, and the
plaintiff could not recover because of failure to show
that the acts of the deceased did not contribute to the
injury. (b)
Unguarded machinery is an obvious dangerand in a
recent case where the plaintiff, who was twenty-seven
years of age, familiar with the business, and had
worked in a certain room for four months was injured by
uncovered gearing, he could not recover. (c)
But the circumstances of each case vary widelyand
the question of due care is submitted to the jury,
under proper instructions from the presiding judge. If
an employee had a right to expect due care from his
employer as to his permanent appliances, and there was
evidence that he was employed to do what he was doing,
and that his position was seen by his employer, and it
(a) Mahoney vs. N.Y.& N.E.Co. 160 Mass. 573.
(b) Mellor vs. Merchant's Co. 150 Mass. 362.
(c) Brown vs. NY.Y & N.E. R.R. 158 Mass. 247.
may be that the doing of his work required him at
moments to be in the position he was in when injured,
the Supreme Court cannot say as matter of law that the
plaintiff was negligent in being where he was. (a)
The words, "ways, works and machinery" are broad
enough it would seem, to cover any and all portions of
the employer's property. There are a large number of
decisions which may be most compactly grouped as to,
First, What are ways, works etc. ? and, Secondwhat are
not ?
First: What are Ways, Works, or Machinery ?
This phrase must be understood to mean such ways, works
etc. as are connected with or used in the business of
the employer by his authority and subject to his control.
It may not be necessary in order to render an employer
liable for an injury occuring to an employee through a
defect in the ways, works etc. that they should belong
to him, but it should at least appear that he has the
control of them and that they are used in his business,
by his authority, express or implied. (b)
(a) Graham vs. Badger, 164 Mass. 48.
(b) Roberts vs. Wallace, Emp. Liab. act, 249,250.
In a late case the plaintiff was injured by the
fall of a staging, which was erected by the side of a
wood pile, for the purpose of enabling the workmen to
pile the wood higher. It was used in one place for a
few days and then moved along. Held, That it was com-
pet ent for the jury to find that the staging when
erected, was a part of the defendant's ways and works.
The superintendent ordered a load of wood to be placed
upon the staging at one time while the custom was to
put half a load. It did not appear that the plaintiff
understood and appreciated the danger of injury from
working on the staging so far that he could be said to
have assumed the risk. (a)
A wire which is part of the electric signal system
of a railroad has been held to be a part of the ways,
works or machinery. In attending to his duties, the
plaintiff tripped and fell over this wire, and all
questions of his negligence or due care were sent to the
jury. (b)
(a) Prendible vs. Conn. R. Mfg. Co. 160 Mass. 131.
(b) Broulette vs. Conn. R.R.R.Co. 162 Mass. 198.
What are not "Ways, Works or Machinery".
A flight of movable stairs leading into and intended
to furnish permanent means of access to a cellar. The
plaintiff was employed by the defendants and was ordered
to carry a bar of iron into the cellar. In descending
the stairs he fell and was injured owing to the stairs
giving away. Held, Defendants did not adopt the stairs
as a "way" used in their business within the statute.(A)
Rubbish on the floor which caused a staging to tip
and throw a workman has been held no defect in the
"ways", and the plaintiff could not recover either at
common law or under the Statute. (b)
In a similar case the plaintiff fell over a pile
of unfinished work, and thrust his hand into a planer.
It was held that there was no ground that any one knew or
appreciated whatever danger there was more fully than
the plaintiff. (c)
A projecting awning on a depot does not constitute
a defect in the "ways", when the awning is in proper
(a) Regan vs. Donovan, 159 Mass. 1.
(b) O'Connor vs Neal, 153 Mass. 281.
(c) May vs. Whittier Machine Co. 154 Mass. 29.
condition, and no action could be maintained for his
injuries by an experienced brakeman who struck the
awning. (a)
The liability of a bank of earth to fall because
not shored up does not constitute a defect in the ways
and works of a permanent character. (b)
A track in the yard of a manufacturing company
owned and repaired by it, used by a railroad for the
delivery of freight is no part of the railroad's ways.(e)
An exploder of copper filled with fulminate of
mercury designed to be discharged by electricity, is not
a part of the "ways" etc. and there is no duty on the
part of the employer to inspect such explosives. (d)
Where there is no defect in the material or con-
struction of a staging, the presence of a stone upon it
by the falling of which personal injuries are occasioned
to a workman is not a defect within the meaning of this
section. (e)
(a) Fiske vs. Fitchburg R.R. 158 Mass 238.
(b) Lynch vs. Allyn, 160 Mass. 249.
(c) Engel vs. N.Y. P. & B. R.R. 160 Mass. 260.
d( Shea vs. Wellington, 163 Mass. 364.
(e) Carroll vs. Wilcutt, 163 Mass. 221.
The phrase "Connected with or used in the business
of the employer" cannot be taken literally, but when
used in connection with "ways, works" etc. must be
understood to mean ways, works, or machinery connected
with or used in the business of the employer by his
authority and subject to his control. Thus, the occas-
ional use by each of two railroad companies of the track
of the other in delivering or taking cars in the course
of business will not, to that extent, make the track
of each company part of the ways, works or machinery
of the other, and it would be unreasonable to compel
each company to have and take cars at the precise point
of connection, at the peril, if it did not do so, of
becoming liable for injuries resulting from any defect
in the track of the other. (a)
The Court has intimated that the Statute does not
take away the rights of parties to make such contracts
as they choose which will establish their resective
rights and duties, saying that they have no doubt that
one may expressly contract to take the obvious risks of
danger from inferior or defective machinery as well
(a) Trash vs. O.C. R.R. 156 Mass. 298.
since the Statute as before. (h)
It has also been held that when a person enters
the service of another, he impliedly agrees to assume
all the obvious risks of the business, including the
risk of injury from the kind of machinery then openly
used, and it is immaterial whether he examined the
machinery before making his contract or not. (b)
Whether a dangerous method of doing business con-
stitutes a defect in the "ways, works" etc. of an
emplbyer, within the meaning of the statute, quare. (c)
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACTSECTION ICLAUSE 2.
This clause is often discussed in suits brought
under the statute, because it offers an important de-
fense to the employer.
We may group the cases under two heads: First; Who
are superintendents, and, Second; Who are not superin-
tendents. It will be seen that the Court refuses to
regard a workman as a superintendent unless he has in
(a) 158 Mass. 135.
(b) Rooney vs. Sewall Co. 161 Mass. 153.
(c) 164 Mass. 523.
fact a right to direct and control inferior employees.
WHO ARE SUPERINTENDENTS ?
A foreman having authority to employ and dismiss
men, who has charge of a Job, gives all the directions
to the men, does not work and is not expected to work
with his own hands, is a person whose sole or prin-
cipal duty is that of superintendence, although there is
a general superintendent over him. (a)
A section foreman in the employ of a railroad,
having charge of a gang of men, whose duty it is to take
receipts, check freight, etc. is a person whose prin-
cipal duty is that of superintendence. (b)
The foreman of a gang of men digging a sewer trench
(c); the workman in charge of the blasting at a quarry,
(d) are superintendents.
The person in charge of repairs on a railroad
track is a person exercising superintendence, and must
warn his gang of the approach of trains when they are
working together, (e), but when the men are seperated,
(a) McPhee vs. Scully,163 Mass. 216.
(b) Mahoney vs. N.Y.& N.E.R.R. 160 Mass. 573.
(c) Hennesy vs. Boston, 161 Mass. 502.
(d) Malcolm vs. Fuller, 152 Mass. 160.
(e) Davis vs. N.Y. N.H. & H.R.R. 159 Mass. 532.
as in different parts of a yard, the superintendent is
not required to warn each workman, but each must look
out for himself. (a)
In Conroy vs. Clinton (b) the plaintiff's intestate
was paid higher wages to superintend, and traced the
trench himself in which he was killed. Held; there could
be no recovery.
The employer is not answerable for the negligence
of a person intrusted with superintendence, who at the
time and in doing the act complained of, is not exer-
cising superintendence, but is engaged in mere manuel
labor, the duty of a common workman. The law recognizes
that an employee may have two duties; that he may be a
s-uperintendent for some purposes, and also an ordinary
workman and that if he is negligent in the latter
capacity, the employer is not answerable unless the
act itself is one of discretion or oversight, tending
to control others and to vary their situation or action
because of his discretion. For the negligence of such
a person in doing the mere work of an ordinary workman,
(a) Lynch vs. B.& A.R.R. 159 Mass. 536.
(b) 158 Mass. 318.
in which there is no exercise of superintendence, the
employer is not made responsible by the Statute. (a)
WHO ARE NOT SUPERINTENDENTS.
In England, the Statute do es not apply to a mere
laborer working under or with others, even though it
may be a part of his duty to look after and attend to
certain instrumentalities. (b)
A person "at work pretty much all the time in
getting out lumber, pi{ing it up or arranging i% and
in operating saws", is not a superintendent. (c)
An ordinary weaver whose usual work is merely to
operate a loom, is not a person entrusted with and
exercising superintendence merely because it is also
his duty, when his loom gets out of repair to notify the
loom fixer to put it in order, because the loom fixer
and weaver are fellow servants. (d)
In Dowd vs. B. & A.R.R. (e) the plaintiff was
injured by being struck by a cement pipe which rolled off
(a) Cashman vs. Chase, 156 Mass. 342.
(b) See Gibbs vs. G.W.R.R. 12 Q.B.D. 208.
(c) O'Brien vw. Rideout, 161 Mass. 170.
(d) Roseback vs. Etna Mills, 158 Mass. 579.
(e) 162. Mass. 185.
from the roof of a round-house which was being repaired
by the defendant's workmen, and recovery was denied be-
cause the person in charge of the repairs was not a su-
perintendent.
Where a workman attended to fires under a boiler,
sharpened tools, charged and cleared out drill holes,
which acts took most of his time, the Court refused to
consider him as a superintendent. Judge Lathrop said
"In a sense it is undoubtedly true that superintendence
is more important than manuel labor, and so if super-
intendence is entrusted to a man who also works with
his hans, it may be said that his principal duty is
that of superintendence. But if the statute had intended
that every person exercising superintendence should not
be considered a fellow servant with a person injured,
there would have been no need of the words "whose sole
or principal duty is that of superintendence". These
words must have a reasonable intrepretation given to
them and a majority of the Court is of the opinion that
it cannot be said of a person who woik s at manuel labor
to the extent shown in this case, that his principal
duty is that of superintendence. (a.
(a) O'Neill vs. O'Leary, 164 Mass. 388.
Where a superintendent accidentally moved an iron
beam which fell through a hole in the floor and injured
the plaintiff, who was working below, the plaintiff
was allowed to go to the jury. The Court held that
the jury would be warranted in finding that the negligence
of the superintenddnt caused the accident. (a)
The sudden jolt of an oil tank on a freight car
which caught and injured the plaintiff's hand, will
not permit of a recovery against the company where
there is no evidence of negligence an the part of the
engineer in failing to stop, start, manage or control
the train properly. (b)
Where a pile of hay fell and there was no evidence
that the defendant's superintendent piled it or had
anything to do with it, there was nothing from which
it could be inferred that it fell because of the super-
intendent's negligence. (c)
No action can be maintained against a city for
the alleged negligence of the assistant superintendent
of streets. (d)
(a) McCauley vs. Norcross, 155 Mass. 584.
(b) Graham vs. B& A.R.R. 156 Mass. 4.
(c) Fitzgerald vs. B.& A.R.R. 156 Mass. 293.
(d) McCann vs. Waltham, 163 Mass. 344.
When it is a part of the ordinary duties of masons
to build their staging without special orders, they
cannot complain if the staging falls that the superin-
tendent neglected to instruct them as to how it should
be built. (a)
The employer is not liable under this clause for
the negligence of his superintendent in furnishing his
employee with a defective appliance if the employer
owes no duty to his employee to have the appliance in-
spected in regard to its construction before use and
if it is no part of the superintendent's business to
make such inspection unless he assumes so to do with
his employer's knowledge and consent, as a part of the
work which as superintendent he is employed to do. (b)
Where the negligence of a superintendent is relied
upon, the negligence must occur not only during the
superintendence, but in the exercise of it. (c)
(a) Burns vs. Washburn, 160 Mass. 457.
(b) Shea vs. Wellington, 163 Mass. 364.
(c) 160 Mass. 248.
SECTION I, CLAUSE 3.
This clause has to do with the right of recovery
for personal injuries sustained owing to the negligence
of persons in charge of railroad appliances. While the
life of a railroad man is dangerous, few decisions have
involved the construction of this clause. The meaning
of a train, as defined by the Court, is a number of
cars coupled together, forming one connected whole, and
moving from one point to another upon a railroad in the
ordinary course of traffic, under an impetus imparted
to them by a locomotive engine, although the engine may
have been detached. (a) But a locomotive engine in a
railroad round house for repairs, is not upon a railroad
within this clause of the statute. (b)
In one case it was shown to be customary to examine
trains in motion, and the plaintiff was inspecting such
a train when another train Came upon him suddenly and
injured him. There was a brakeman on the train who
should have warned the plaintiff. Held, that it was not
(a) Caron vs. B& A.R.R. 164 Mass. 523.
(b) Perry vs. O.C.R.R. 164 Mass. 296.
necessary that the person in charge be a conductor, if he
had control for the time being. (a) "Charge or control"
means that some person, for the time being at least,
has immediate authority to direct the movements and
management of the train as a whole, and of the men
engaged upon it. It is not necessary that the person
should be upon the train itself, and it is possible that
more than one person may have charge at the same time.(b)
At the present time a car in use by or in the
possession of a railroad company is a part of the ways,
works or machinery of the company using or having the
same in possession, whether owned by it or by some other
company. Where there is evidence of too much lateral
motion of the draw bars of a car which was neglected
or overlooked by the inspector, the question of proper
care is for the jury.(d) In an earlier case an empty
freight car, while being shifted upon a connecting line,
was held not to be a part of the ways, works etc. and
for an injury caused by a defective brake wheel to a
Steffe vs. O.C.R.R. 156 Mass. 262.
(b) Bowers vs. Conn. R.R. 162 Mass. 312.
brakeman upon the car, no recovery could be had against
the company using it. (a) (See the amendment,Statute
1893. Chapter 359.)
PART II.
SECTION TWO. ACTION BY WIDOW OR NEXT OF KIN WHEN IN-
STANTANEOUS DEATH.
"Where an employee is instantly killed, or dies
without conscious sutffering, as the result of the neg-
ligence of an employer, or of the negligence of any
person for whose negligence the employer is liable under
the provisions of this act, the widow of the deceased,
or in case there is no widow, the next of kin, provided
that such next of kin were at the time of the death of
such employee dependent upon the wages of such employee
for support, may maintain an action for damages therefor
and may recover in the same manner, to the same extent,
as if the death of the deceased had not been instantan-
eous, or as if the deceased had consciously suffered."
The Court construes the, words "without conscious
suffering" strictly. The employee, if not instantly
(a) Coffee vs. N.Y.N.H. & H.R.R. 155 Mass. 21.
killed, must die without recovering consciousness. In
Hodnet vs. B.& A. R.R. (a), the injury was suffered at
11:10 A. M., and death followed at I P.M., leaving to
conjecture whether he regained consciousness or not.
This was held not a sufficient compliance with the
statute, for it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove
that the death thus actually took place and also that
she was dependent upon the wages of the deceased for
support. In another case, the plaintiff's husband
was crushed between two cars while he was inspecting
pins, couplings etc. in the performance of his duty,
owing to a car being negligently sent against those he
was inspecting . The evidence showed that deceased was
in the exercise of due care while the conductor was
negligent. The man was crushed, but a witness testified
that he took two or three steps and then fell. The
court said this did not necessarily imply any voluntary
action or consciousness on his part. (b)
Where a brakeman was killed by coming in contact
(a) 156 Mass. 86.
(b) Mears vs. B.& M.R.R. 163 Mass. 150.
with a bridge while riding on the top of a tall freight
car because the "tell tales" were out of repair, the train
running twenty miles per hour, the inference was that
death was instantanwous or that he died without con-
scious suffering. (a)
This section gives a right of action to the widow
or next of kin, without indicating anything as to the
mode of assessing damages. But the fact that they are
dependent upon the wages of the deceased for support
must be shown, or the action cannot be maintained.
There is no difficulty in showing that a widow was de-
pendent upon the wages of a husband , and a daughter
who lived with her father, receiving all his wages,
keeping house for him and for her brothers, although
the brothers paid her for their board, is"dependant"
within the meaning of this section. (b)
In Lathrop vs. Fitchburg R.R. (c) the next of kin
of a brakeman sought to recover for his death. He was
killed while coupling cars on which long timbers were
loa ed, the ends projecting beyond the cars, and crushing
(a) Maher vs. B.& A.R.R. 158 Mass. 36.
(b) Houlihan vs. Conn.R.R.R. 164 Mass. 555.
Lathrop vs. Fitchburg R.R. 150 Mass. 423.
his head. It was admitted that he could have avoided
the danger by stooping, and the court refused to main-
tain the action because he was not in the exercise of
due care. In a similar case a conductor was struck on
the head and killed. The accident happened before the
Statute, but the Court held that having assumed the
risk of what he did, no action could be maintained
against the Company. (a)
The mere fact that after the accident precautions
were taken to prevent a recurrence is not admissable
in favor of a plaintiff whose husband was killed by the
caving in of a trench, either at common law or under
the Statute. (b)
In trying an action under this section where the
intestate left as his sole next of kin a sister who was
"dependent" upon him, and a brother who was self sup-
porting, the action should properly be brought in the
name of the sister alone. (c)
(a) Boyle vs. N.Y.& N.E.R.R. 151 Mass. 102.
(b) Shinners vs. Proprieters etc. 154 Mass. 168.
(c)Daly vs. N.J. Co. L55 Mass. 1.
In this case the sister was unable to work regularly
or to earn enough to pay her doctor's bills, md had
received from her deceased brother from $30 to $35 per
month for three or four years, and the Court very pro-
perly considered her "dependent".
PART III.
SECTION THREE. LIMIT AND AMOUNT OF COMPENSATIONNOTICE
OF TIME, PLACE, AND CAUSE, LIMITATION OF ACTION AND
INACCURACY IN THE NOTICE.
(Except in actions brought by the personal repre-
sentatives, under section one of this act, to recover
damages for both the injury and death of an employee) (a)
the amount of compensation receivable under this act in
cases of personal injury shall -not exceed the sum of
Four thousand dollars. In case of death ( which follows
instantaneously or without conscious suffering) (a),
compensation in lieu thereof may be recovered in not
less than Five Hundred and not more than Five Thousand
dollars, to be assessed with reference to the degree
(a) Amended by Statute 1888, Chap. 155.
of culpability of the employer herein, or the person for
whose negligence he is made liable, and no action for
the recovery of compensation for injury or death under
this act shall be maJintained unless notice of the time,
place and cause of the injury is given to the employer
within thirty days and the action is commenced within
one year from the occurrence of the accident causing the
injury or death. (a) (The notice required by this
section shall be in writing signed by the person injured
or by some one in his behalf; but if from phystcal or
mental incapacity it is impossible for the person injured
to give the notice within the time provided in said
section, he may give the same within ten days after
such incapacity is removed and in case of his death,
without having given the notice and without having been
for ten days at any time after his injury of sufficient
capacity to give the notice, his executor or administra-
tor may give such notice within thirty days after his ap-
pointment), but no notice given under the provisions
of this section shall be deemed to be invalid or
(a) Amended by Statute 1888, Chapter 155.
insufficient solely by reason of any inaccuracy in
stating the time, place or cause of the injury, provided
it is shown that there was no intention to mislead and
that the party entitled to notice was not in fact mis-
lead thereby.
The Legislature wisely put a limit to the amount
which can be recovered for personal injuries. Many
causes of action arise where a jury would make a heavy
award of damages owing to the shocking nature of the
accident and the apparent heartlessness of the cor-
poration. In Massachusetts, the damages awarded are for
"compensation" alone and in no case are vindictive or
punative damages allowed. (a)
The administrator of an employee has no right of
action against the employer for causing the employee's
death in addition to the right as legal representative
to recover damages accruing to the intestate in his
lifetime, but this section settles the amount to be
recovered, first in cases under section 1, second in
(a) See Burt vs. Adv. Co. 154 Mass. 245.
cases under section 2. (a)
In bringing suit the Practice Act, so called, re-
quires that substantial facts necessary to constitute
the cause of action be stated, with substantial cer-
tainty and without unnecessary verbage. Evidence need
not be set forth in the declaration for if the declar-
ation does not give the defendant reasonable knowledge
of the nature and grounds of the action, he may apply
to the Court for a bill of particulars. (b)
The giving of notice to the employer is a condition
precedent of the employee's right to recover. This
notice need not go into details but must accurately
state the time, place and cause of the injury. All
notices required by the statute are not to be construed
with technical strictness, but enough should appear in
them to show that they are intended as the basis of a
claim against the city, town ( or corporation) and are
given on behalf of the person who brings the suit. (c)
In Dolan vs. Alley et al, (6), the plaintiff was
(a) Ramsdell vs. N.Y.& N.E.R.R. 151 Mass. 245.
(b) Pub. Stats. Chap. 167. Sec. 2, 61.
(c) Driscoll vs. Fall River, 163 Mass. 108.
(d) 153 Mass. 380.
injured by the falling in of a roof and steam pipes
fastene.d thereto, caused by the accumulation of snow
on the roof, which the defendant's superintendent had
negligently failed to remove. Notice was duly given
signed by the attorneys for the plaintiff. This was
held sufficient by the Court and the plaintiff recovered.
The notice required may be given by some one in the
intestate's behalf within thirty days from the occur-
rence of the accident or by his executor or adminis-
trator within thirty days after his appointment. The
widow may give the notice . (a)
The appointment of the executor or administrator
is made by the probate Court and it seems that the no-
tice must be given within thirty days after the appoint-
ment, although' the appointment is not complete until a
bond has been filed. (b)
The intention is that the employer may know whether
he must defend or settle a suit at an early date.
This question has been somewhat discussed by the
(a) Daly vs. N.J.Co. 155 Mass. 1.
Gustafsen vs. W. & M. Co. 153 Mass. 468.
(b) Smith's Probate Law. p. 108.
Court in two recent decisions. (a)
There must not be delay in serving the notice,
for where the notice was not served until after the
writ was made in an action for injuries, although the
notice was left at the defendant's house on the same
day the writ was dated, the action could not be main-
tained. (b)
It is not necessary to refer to the defendant's
superintendent or other person in charge or to his con-
duct, where the cause of the injury is properly stated.
In Beauregard vs. Webb Co. (c) the notice stated
that the cause of the injury was the fall of stones from
a derrick on the deceased, through the nmgligence of the
defendant or its du1lerintendent. Held; that the notice
was ei-ther sufficient in itself, or the jury might have
found it sufficient on the ground that there was na
intention to mislead and that in fact the defendant was
not mislead by it.
(a) Jones vs. B.& A.R.R. 157 Mass. 51.
Dickerman vs. O.C.R R. 157 Mass. 52.
(b) Veginan vs. Morse 160 Mass. 143.
(c) 160 Mass. 201.
PART IV.
SECTION FOUR. LIABILITY IN CASE OF SUB CONTRACT: WHEN.
Whenever an employer enters into a contract, either
written or verbal, with an independant contractor to do
a part of such employer's work, or whenever such con-
tractor enters into a contract with a sub- contractor
to do all or any part of the work comprised in such
contractor's contract with the employer, such contract
or sub contract shall not bar the liability of the em-
ployer for injuries to the employees of such contractor
or sub contractor by reason of any defect in the con-
dition of the ways, works machinery or plant, if they are
the property of the employer or furnished by him, and if
such defect arose or had not been discovered or remedied
through the negligence of the enployer or of some person
entrusted by him with the duty of seeing that they
were in proper condition.
The purpose of this section is to enlarge the lia-
bility of an employer; otherwise it is meaningless. The
inference from the section is that the employer should
be liable when a contractor does part of his work, and
an employee of the contractor is injured by a defect
in the condition of the ways, works, machinery or plant
furnished by the employer to the contractor, which has
not been discovered or remedied through the negligence
of the employer or of some person entrusted by him with
the duty of seeing that they were in pro~per condition.
By the negligence of the employer, his own negligence
is intended, in distinction from that of his servant or
superintendent, which is included in the latter part of
the sentence. (a)
PART V.
SECTION FIVE. Knowledge of Defect by Employee without
Informing.
An employee or his legal representatives, shall not
be entitled under this c act to any right of compen-
sation or remedy against his employer in any case where
such employee knew of the defect or negligence which
caused the injury and failed within a reasonable time,
(a) See opinion of Morton J. Toomey vs. Donovan,158Mass.208
to give or cause to be given, information thereof to the
employer or to some person superior to himself in the
service of the employer who had entrusted to him some
general superintendence.
Section five was intended not to create conditions
precedent which the plaintiff must show have been com-
plied with before he can maintain an action, but to
give to the employer a new ground of defense. The bur-
den of showing which rests upon the defendant. (a)
It would be unjust to compel an employer to pay
for injuries resulting from defective machinery which
the employee knew about and continued to use without
complaint. The workman constantly using and witnessing
the workings of a machine, is far more likely to know
of its defects than his employer. The question of
what is a "reasonable time" after discovery of the
defect will be left to the jury.
(a) Connolly vs. Waltham, 156 Mass. 368.
PART VI.
SECTION SIX. MITIGATION OF DAMAGES WHERE EMPLOYEE RE-
CEIVES BENEFIT FROM RELIEF FUND TO WHICH EMPLOYER HAS
CONTRIBUTED.
Any employer who shall have contributed to any
insurance fund created and maintained for the mutual
purpose of indemnifying an employee for personal injury
for which compensation may be recovered under this
act, or to any releif society formed under Chapter 244
of the acts of 1882 as authorized by Chapter 125 of the
acts of 1886, may prove, in mitigation of damages re-
coverable by an employee under this act, such proportion
of the pecuniary benefit which has been received by
such employee from any such fund or society on account
of such contribution od said employer, as a contribution
of such employer to such fund or society bears to the
whole contribution thereto.
If an employer's business is so hazardous that he
fears that actions may be brought against him under the
statute, he can protect himself under this section.
He may create and maintain an insurance fund, or
contribute to the societies mentioned in the Statute
above. Statute 1882 Chapter 244 authorizes the formation
of releif societies by the employees of railroad and
steamboat corporations, and Statute 1886 Chapter 125
authorizes railroad corporations to join such relief so-
cieties.
No case has yet arose calling for an intwrpretation
or construction of this section.
SECTION SEVEN. APPLICATION OF THE ACT LIMITED.
This act shall not apply to injuries caused to
domestic servants or farm laborers by other fellow
employees, and shall take effect on the first day of
September, eighteen hundred and eighty seven.
It seems that household servants or "hired men"
on a Massachusetts farm, must remain content with the
common law remedy against their employer if they are
injured. In a, recent case a laundress who lived
some distance from her employer was now and then
carried by a coachman of the employer to or from her
work. One morning there was not room enough on the seat,
so the plaintiff clambered onto the wagon and sat upon
a camp chair en route, while the horse was being driven
at a "smartish pace", as an English Judge would say.
A sudden turn was made at a corner and the lady thrown
out. Held; in an action against the employer for her
injuries, that she was a fellow servant of the coachman
and could not recover, neither was the employer liable
for her carelessness in riding on such a seat and that
it was her own act which caused the injury. (a)
GENERAL DECISIONS ON THE STATUTE.
Some twenty five cases must be briefly discussed
under this head, which do not strictly fall under any
particular section. The lawyers of the State begn
cautiously to bring actions under the statute, and some
of the early suits failed because of failure to make
out a case within the Statute. The first case was that
of Ashley vs. Hart and another (a) decided in 1888.
The accident happened less than two months after
the Statute took effect. The judges disposed of it with
(a) McGuirk vs. Shattuck, 160 Mass. 45.
(b) 147 Mass. 573.
a short opinion "by the Court", citing no authorities.
The plaintiff was a painter and with another workman,
was painting a house, suspended by a stage. Each
looked after his end when the stage was raised or
lowered, but the other workman neglected to fasten his
end securely, which, giving away, threw the plaintiff
to the ground. Held; that the statute does not give
a right of action against the employer for the negli-
gence of a fellow servant in using or handling a machin
tool, or appliance which is itself in a proper condition.
Here the injury resulted from the negligence of a fellow
servant, thus failing to state a case within the
statute. The next action failed because the injury had
happened before the Statute took effect. (b)
In the next reported case the plaintiff was an ex-
pert machinest, who had accidentally put his hand into
an exposed gearing. Held; that having assumed the risks
of his employment, he could not recover, and further,
no notice as required by the Statute, was given to the
employer. (a)
(al Foley vs. PetteeMach. Wks. 149 Mass. 294.
(b) Dunlap vs. Barney Co. 148 Mass. 51.
The old common law action for personal injuries
is not barred, and it is not necessary to rely on the
statute where the common law liability is clear, as
where a laborer employed to unload coal from a boat fell
through a hole and was injured. He had no notice of
any defect, and it was held that the defendants owed
him a duty not to injure him after inviting him to
come on board the vessel. (a)
If the relation of Employer and employee did not
exist b:etween the parties, the action cannot be main-
tained. (b)
The employer is not liable either at common law
or under the Statute, for injuries occasioned to any
employee by reason of a defect in a machine or appliance
or of the employer's failure to instruct him respecting
his duties if the only defect relied on had no connection
with the accident and there was no defect or danger of
which it was the employer's duty to wqrn the employee or
any particulars in which the employee should have been
(a) Coughlin vs. Boston Co. 151 Mass. 92.
(b) Dane vs. Cochrane Co. 164 Mass. 453.
instructed. (a)
In the following cases, the liability was held to
be a question of fact for the jury where the injuries
caused by a staging alleged as defective. (b) Where
a car was left on a track so that only five tracks re-
mained between the car and a passing train (c), and
where a workman was assisting in pulling a freight car
along on a track on the employer's premises whth his
back to the car. In crossing a newly opened ditch
under the track he fell and was killed by the car. The
ditch was visible but not guarded and no warning of its
existance had been given. The jury must decide whether
there was a defect in the ways, and whether the deceased
was in the exercise of due care. (d)
If the defect or danger is apparent to the workman
there can be no recovery, as when a workman had his
hand drawn into a wheel or drum around which a rope
was wound in the storage of ice (e); when a track in-
(a) Brady vs. Ludlow, 154 Mass. 468.
(b) Brommie vs. Hogan, 153 Mass. 29.
(c) Dacey vs. O.C.R.R. 153 Mass. 112.
(d) Gustafsen vs. W. & M. Co. 153 Mass. 468.
(e) Carbury vs. Downing, 154 Mass. 248.
spector chose to operate his hand car on a railroad
track used by trains going either way, and proceeded
without lights in his lamps (a); and when no duty rests
upon a railroad to alter certain timbering or planking
by which an employee was injured, the employee being
familiar with the same, he is held to have assumed the
risk and cannot recover. (b)
If the law of another State where a personal injury
is suffered, allows a recovery, an action may be main-
tained for the injury in Mass., although the plaintiff
could not have recovered had the accident happened here.
(c). If, in an action under the statute, for causing
the death of an employee, the evidence introduced is of
such a nature that the questions how the accident
happened and whether the deceased was using due care
can be answered only by conjecture, the action cannot
be maintained. (d) In Thyng vs. Fitchburg R.R. (e)
(a) Tyndale vs. 0.C.R.R. 156 Mass. 503.
(b) Gleason vs. N.Y.& N.E.R.R. 159 Mass. 68.
(c) Walsh vs. N.Y.& N.E.R.R. 160 Mass. 571.
Higgins vs. Cent.N.E.etc. R.R. 155 Mass. 176.
(d) Irwin vs. Alley, 158 Mass. 249.
(e) 156 Mass. 13.
Geyette vs. F.R.R. 162 Mass. 549.
a train broke apart and killed a brakeman, owing to the
negligence of those who made up the train in using too
short a pin. Held; no recovery, because it was the
fault of the fellow employees and not of the employer.
Similar holdings were made where a plaintiff, while
cleaning a car was thrown over a seat because the car
was sent violently against a post. (a), "and where
wovkmen allowed a truck to fall through a hole in the
floor, which injured the plaintiff below. (b)
Also where the plaintiff's intestate, with others,
was putting up a telegraph pole which fell across the
railroad track. In getting the pole off, the deceased
was struck and killed by a train which could not stop
in time to prevent the accident. Held; that there was
no evidence of negligence on the part of the engineer in
failing to stop sooner. (c). A city is not liable for
the breaking of a defective pole to which were fastened
the fire signal wires. (d)
The same case that people of ordinary prudence
(a) Devine vs. B.& A.R.R. 159 Mass. 348.
(b) O'Keefe vs. Brownell, 156 Mass. 131.
(c) Chisolim vs. O.C.R.R. 159 Mass. 3.
(d) Pittingell vs. Chelsea, 161 Mass. 368.
would exercise under the same circumstances is all that
is required of the plaintiff. (a) But no action either
at common law or under the Statute, could be maintained
for injuries to a plaintiff's intestate who voluntarily
undertook to whitewash the walls and ceiling of a card
room in a factory. He was cautioned to look out for the
machinery, and was capable of understanding the danger,
yet worked while the machinery was in motion, fell and
was killed. (b)
(a) Brich vs. Bosworth, 162 Mass. 334.
(b) Connelly vs. Hamilton CO, 163 Mass. 156.
CONCLUS ION.
The Employer's Liability Act has been in force for
fully nine years, and as has been seen in briefly dis-
cussing the cases there have been some eighty decisions
and with a number of cases undoubtedly yet unsettled.
In many counties the Tort cases are found un-
doubtedly on every trial list of the Superior Court,
and in most of the trials, exceptions are taken, which
bring the cases before the Supreme Judicial Court for
determination. Almost one half of the cases arise
from injuries received on Railroads, one fourth in fact-
ories, and one fourth in other employments. In some
cases, perhaps the deserving plaintiff fails to recover,
(owing to some technicality) for his injuries, in most
cases where the Statute has been complied with the
employer is held responsible for the injury.
This Statute undoubtedly makes the employer of
labor more watchful, and consequently he, (the em-
ployer) uses more care and looks after the wellfare of
his employees, (who are at the best not treated any too
well) with due diligence and acts as a prudent man
should in protecting the life and limb of the employee.
With' this we will close our subject, adding that
it would seem on the whole, that the work of the Leg-
islature in the protection of the laboring classes,
has not been in vain, and that the Employer's Liabili-
ty Act answers a long felt need in that direction,'
J :i-
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